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This paper investigates if di¤erences in environmental regulations can inu-
ence FDI ows in a multi-country setting taking into account the so-called third-
country" e¤ect. We examine bilateral FDI ows using a new extended OECD
investment database which covers great number of host countries and a long sample
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rm the existence of a negative relationship
between FDI and environmental stringency, once we correct for endogeneity and
spatial dependence. The evidence of a positive "third-country" e¤ect for FDI sug-
gests the prevalence of complex FDI from developed to developing countries. The
spatial structure of the model allows also to underline the possible existence of
competition in environmental standards between countries to attract FDI.
Keywords: Complex FDI, Pollution Haven, Spatial Econometrics
JEL classication: Q56, F21, F18
Madina Kukenova, Department of Econometrics and Political Economy , University of Lausanne,
1015 Lausanne, Switzerland. E-mail: madina.kukenova@unil.ch
yJosé-Antonio Monteiro, Institute for Research in Economics, Pierre-à-Mazel 7, University of Neucha-
tel, 2000 Neuchâtel, Switzerland. E-mail: jose-antonio.monteiro@unine.ch
zA version of this paper has been presented at the SMYE 2008 Conference in Lille, France, the
"Young Researchers" seminar at the University of Geneva and at the "Research Day Ph.D. students"
DEEP at the University of Lausanne.
1
1 Introduction
The growing role of multinational enterprises associated with the progressive liberal-
ization of foreign direct investment (FDI) regimes has brought attention toward their
environmental consequences on host countries. One of the most controversial debate
today is whether pollution-intensive industries relocate to countries with less stringent
environmental policies, turning these countries into pollution havens.
This paper investigates if di¤erences in environmental regulations can inuence FDI
ows in a multi-country setting using bilateral data and taking into account the so-
called third-country e¤ects. The pollution haven e¤ect (PHE) refers to the possibility
that FDI could be sensitive to weaker environmental regulation, especially when pollut-
ing rms want to avoid the costs associated with environmental standards compliance.
While the intuitive logic behind the PHE is rather simple, moving from a theoretical hy-
pothesis to testing in the real world has given rise to some di¢ culties. Empirical studies
designed to test this hypothesis have so far shown little evidence, but su¤er potentially
from omitted variable bias, specication and measurement errors. Most empirical stud-
ies rely on a two-country framework, which ignore spatial dependence in multilateral FDI
decisions. The inclusion of "third-country" e¤ects, which capture the e¤ect of proximity
of other neighborhood host countries to a particular host country, is necessary to explain
the emergence of new types of integrated FDI. As emphasized in the literature, failure
to account for "third-country" e¤ects in empirical studies of FDI may lead to biased
inference. This may be particularly problematic in the context of empirical studies of
the PHE for three interrelated reasons. First, the impact of environmental stringency
is not homogenous across di¤erent types of FDI. Second, environmental policies have
been shown to be spatially correlated. Finally, it has proven extremely di¢ cult to nd
credible instrumental variables for environmental regulation. As a consequence, it is
extremely important to control for relevant determinants of FDI.
We examine bilateral FDI ows using a new extended OECD investment database
which covers a great number of host countries and a relatively long sample period (1981-
2005). To our knowledge, it is the rst attempt to analyze the pollution haven e¤ect with
bilateral FDI at the worldwide level from a "third-country" perspective. We estimate
a spatial gravity like model controlling for relevant FDIs determinants and exploring
spatial features of the data. The ndings are largely plausible across specications
and conrm the existence of a negative relationship between FDI and environmental
stringency (proxied by SO2 emission per capita, CO2 emission per capita and interna-
tional environmental treaties). The evidence suggests the prevalence of complex vertical
integrated FDI from high income OECD countries to less developed countries, where
environmental stringency of the host and neighborhood countries are important.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the di¤erent
reasons that lie behind the inclusion of third-country e¤ects and presents an overview of
the previous empirical literature on FDI-PHE linkages. Section 3 describes the model
specication, econometric procedure and the data used. Section 4 and 5 report the
empirical analysis of the model and robustness check, respectively. Finally, section 6
concludes.
2 FDI-Pollution Haven-Spatial Linkages
Dened as "investment made to acquire a lasting interest in enterprises operating out-
side of the economy of the investor", foreign direct investment is characterized by a
relationship between a parent enterprise and a foreign a¢ liate which together form a
transnational corporation (TNC). One of the most important characteristic that sets
FDI apart from other types of capital inows is the element of control, by the foreign
investor over acquired assets. However, FDI are not only made of capital or direct
technology transfer but they can also include intangible assets such as technology and
management skills.
2.1 Sources of FDI, Pollution Haven and Spatial Linkages
Analyzing FDI gives rise to two distinct questions. The rst question, "why do FDI
exist", is answered by determining the motives for which rms want to undertake FDI.
Until recently, most multinational enterprises(MNE) motivations illustrated in the lit-
erature relied on a two-country framework, where FDI between home country i and
host country j was only a¤ected by both countriescharacteristics. The underlying as-
sumption was that FDI allocation was spatially independent. However, new types of
FDI have emerged in the last twenty years. Multinationals are involved in hybrid FDI,
which are neither purely vertical nor purely horizontal. MNEs can allocate FDI in a host
country but can also engage in trade or FDI in a third country. The location decision of
these new type of FDI will not only depend on the home and host countriesdetermi-
nants, but also on the factors of the hosts neighborhood countries. These more complex
integrated FDI are embedded in a multilateral decision-making process, which means
that FDI decisions across various host countries are not spatially independent. Other
elements may also lead to interdependent FDI decisions across host countries, includ-
ing imperfect capital markets and agglomeration externalities (spillovers) which limit
the necessary funds a multinational company has to commit abroad. From a theoreti-
cal viewpoint, spatial dependence follows directly from Toblers rst law of geography
(1970), according to which everything is related to everything else, but near things
are more related than distant things. From an econometric point of view, this spatial
dependence is measured by dening a spatial weight matrix which allows measuring
the potential third-country e¤ect between neighborhood locations. This spatial depen-
dence is econometrically important because it can give rise to a problem of variables
omission. Since previous research on FDI and pollution haven linkages disregards the
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spatial features of FDI decisions, the estimations and statistical inferences in the past
research remain questionable. This estimation problem might be even more problem-
atic, because most studies ignore also the fact that environmental stringency policies are
spatially correlated (Davies et al. (2006), Fredriksson and Millimet (2002)). Empirical
evidence suggests that environmental policies tend to be similar between countries with
close trade relations (Eliste and Fredriksson (2002)).
Based on the theoretical work by Markusen (2002), Yeaple (2003) and Egger and
Pfa¤ermayr (2004), Baltagi et al. (2007) derived a model of MNE activities that al-
lows to distinguish four types of multinational strategies (see Table 1). Following these
distinctions, Blonigen et al. (2007) proposed a simplied theoretical framework and
empirical model to assess the four di¤erent spatial FDI relationships mentioned in the
literature. The estimation procedure relies on a spatial autoregressionmodel which
includes two spatial variables: a spatial lag dependent variable (i.e. a spatially-weighted
sum of bilateral FDI from a given host country to other host countries) and a market
potential variable (i.e. a spatially-weighted sum of other host countriesmarket size).
These distinctions are also important, because these four di¤erent categories of FDI re-
spond di¤erently to the host and neighboring countriesenvironmental stringency. Table
1 summarizes the four forms of MNE behavior in terms of spatial and environmental
stringency responsiveness.
Table 1: Spatial and Environmental linkages in MNE Choices.
FDI Motivation Horizontal Vertical Export Complex
FDI FDI Platform FDI FDI
Spatial Lag 0     +
Market Potential 0 0 + +=0
Environmental Stringency 0    =0  
Spatial Environmental Stringency 0 + +=0 +
Source: Blonigen et al. (2005, 2007), Baltagi et al. (2007), Garretsen et al. (2008)
Horizontal FDI aim at seeking opportunities to sell in foreigner markets. A MNE in
home country i, which wants to serve foreign markets j and k, can export the products
or launch a production unit in both host countries. Market seeking FDI is more likely to
happen with su¢ ciently high trade costs between the home country i and countries j and
k. In terms of third-country e¤ects, the decision to undertake FDI in country j is more
likely to be independent to the decision regarding country k and its market potential. In
terms of environmental stringency, this type of FDI is a priori not especially sensitive to
di¤erences in environmental costs, although it has to meet some environmental standards
to be authorized to sell the products on the host market.
Vertical FDI aim at obtaining low price resources or access to critical resources not
available in the home economy. Since resource-seeking FDI is driven by factor cost di¤er-
ences between the home and host countries and not by market potential considerations,
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vertical FDI from home country i to country j will be undertaken at the expense of ver-
tical FDI from i to another host country k. High environmental standards in country j
will a¤ect negatively FDI from home country i to country j, while higher environmental
stringency in neighboring country k will have a positive e¤ect on FDI from i to host j,
other things being equal, i.e. the MNE might choose location j over location k.
The main objective of export platform FDI is to serve regional export markets
through a platform for production and sales (Ekholm et al. (2003), Yeaple (2003),
and Bergstrand and Egger (2004)). This type of FDI has elements of both vertical and
horizontal FDI. The specic location within a region is dened by cost considerations,
as in vertical investments, while the sales in an integrated market respond to horizontal
FDI considerations. A MNE in home country i will engage in production-platform-
seeking FDI in host country j if the trade cost between potential host countries j and k
are lower than between country i with respect to j and k. This way, it can serve more
e¢ ciently the combined markets j and k from a single FDI location. The larger (and
close to host j ) markets in country k the more attractive country j is as a location for
export platform motivated FDI. Since the establishment of a new production plant is
costly (production is characterized by increasing returns to scale), an increase in export
platform FDI from parent country i to third country k implies less FDI from i to host
country j, other things being equal. In terms of environmental stringency, export plat-
form FDI can be a¤ected in two di¤erent ways. On one hand, if the purpose of FDI is
to serve export markets in developed countries through a platform production in a de-
veloping country and the access to these markets depends on the environmental product
standards of the developed countries, the host country js environmental regulation is
no longer important. In this case, FDI to country j is likely to be associated with new
techniques, including the latest abatement technologies (California e¤ect), making the
environmental stringency in the host country j no longer relevant. On the other hand,
if the multinational wants to serve neighboring developing countries, the environmental
stringency in the host country still matters. The production-location decision in host
country j will be negatively a¤ected by higher environmental stringency in host j, but
environmental standards between close countries (j and k) should be relatively close so
the MNE can serve both markets using the same production process. If the company
expects in the future an increase in environmental stringency in the host country j and
its neighboring countries, it may choose today a production process that will meet higher
standards in the future. In this case, the environmental regulation in country j would
no longer matter, since the MNE no longer experience a comparative advantage when
locating in country j with lower environmental regulation.
Complex (vertical) FDI is characterized by a multinational rm from home country i
which owns not only a production plant in host country j but also one in third country k,
in order to exploit the comparative advantages of various locations. This type of FDI is
associated with exports of intermediate inputs from a¢ liates (j and k) to another third
market for further (or nal) processing, before being dispatched to its nal destination.
The search for (low cost) suppliers in multiple (close) countries leads to the slicing-up of
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the value-chainof the production process (e.g. Baltagi, Egger and Pfa¤ermayr (2007)).
If both adjacent host countries j and k present similar supply network characteristics, the
MNE may nd it advantageous to launch production in host k given that it already owns
production plants in (contiguous) host country j. Thus, complex FDI are characterized
by a complementary relationship: complex FDI from home country i to third country k
constitutes a complement for FDI from home country i to host country j. This positive
relationship is strengthened if j and k are neighboring countries. Market potential
in this type of FDI should not matter, although the level of industrial production in
neighborhood countries should be positively correlated with higher opportunities for
vertical suppliers (e.g. agglomeration incentives (Garretsen et al. (2008)). This last
category of FDI is particularly sensitive to environmental stringency in a given host
and its neighboring countries, because the most polluting stage of production is more
likely to be located in the host country characterized by less environmental stringency.
The intermediate input will then be exported to one or more third-country for further
processing, in order for the nal good to be shipped to its nal destination (e.g. home
market).
Once the motivations for di¤erent types of FDI are known, a second question arises:
"why does a particular country attract FDI". The answer is given by identifying the most
important host countrys location factors. A variety of theoretical and empirical studies
on FDI have tried to identify the elements of attractiveness that draw FDI to a country
(Sethi et al. (2003), Blonigen (2005)). Some of these factors are encompassed in formal
theories or hypotheses, while others are suggested on intuition ground. But so far, there
is no consensus view dening an accepted set of explanatory variables considered as the
true determinants of FDI. This problem of open-endedness theories could be explained
by the lack of consensus to the wide di¤erences in perspectives, methodologies, sample-
selection and analytical tools (Chakrabarti (2001)). Moreover, most empirical results
are sensitive to the model specication and lack robustness (Moosa et al. (2006)).
2.2 Literature Review
This study bases on two di¤erent types of empirical literature. The rst one is related
to complex FDI and spatial econometrics applications, while the second focuses on the
linkages between FDI and the pollution haven e¤ect. This section attempts to shed
some light on both empirical literatures, with an emphasis on the most recent works.
Empirical FDI studies allowing for the impact of third-country e¤ects and applying
spatial econometrics are sparse. Despite mixed evidence, these studies highlight the
importance of spatial interdependence. Coughlin and Segev (1999) were the rst to
apply spatial econometric techniques to study the geographic distribution of FDI. Their
results indicate that FDI into one location within China is positively associated with
FDI into other close Chinese locations. Blonigen, Davies, Naughton and Waddell (2005)
consider inbound FDI from OECD countries to the US. They nd strong and robust
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evidence for parent market proximity e¤ects but it mainly depends on the sample selec-
tion. Hisarciklilar, Kayam and Kayalica (2006) consider the role of market potential
in MENA countries by estimating a modied gravity model allowing for spatial auto-
correlation in the disturbances with both spatial and time xed e¤ects. Their results
indicate that FDI to MENA region are market oriented and aiming at the domestic
market in the host economy. More recently, Baltagi, Egger and Pfa¤ermayr (2007)
study the third-country e¤ects associated with US outbound FDI for seven manufac-
turing industries across both developed and less-developed destinations. Their GMM
results nd substantial evidence of spatial interactions, though they cannot denitively
conclude whether export-platform or complex vertical FDI is more prevalent. Blonigen,
Davies, Waddell, and Naughton (2007) focus on aggregate U.S. outward FDI to OECD
countries at the country-level. While the estimated relationships of traditional determi-
nants of FDI are robust to the inclusion of spatial interdependence, export-platform FDI
seem to have greater prevalence, although the results are quite sensitive to the sample
of countries examined. Following Blonigen et al. (2007), Garretsen and Peeters (2008)
estimate a spatial lag model for Dutch FDI to 18 host countries. Based on maximum
likelihood estimations, third-country e¤ects do matter, but are also sensitive to sample
and model selection.
The existing empirical research on environmental regulations-and FDI linkages dis-
plays mixed results depending on the type of studies. The rst strand of literature
considers inows of FDI to a single country at the regional and/or industrial level. The
evidence suggests that stringer regional environmental regulation does inuence nega-
tively the location decision of inward FDI in the USA, India and China (List and Co
(2001), Gamper-Rabindran and Jha (2004), Ljungwall and Linde Rahr (2005), Zhang
(2006), He (2006) and Di (2007)). The evidence of pollution haven e¤ect is however
less clear and robust at the industrial level (Keller and Levinson (2002), Henderson
and Millimet (2007), Millimet and Racine (2007), Waldkrich and Gopinath (2008)). In
fact, environmental regulation can inuence negatively the location decision of a specic
polluting industry and have no e¤ect whatsoever on another polluting industry. Inter-
estingly, Dean et al. (2004) show that FDI from south-asian (OECD) countries to China
are (not) attracted by low environmental stringency, regardless of the pollution intensity
of the industry1. Following Blonigen et al. (2005), Drukker and Millimet (2007) assess
the presence of "third-country" e¤ects in the determination of the spatial distribution of
inbound US FDI. Applying spatial econometrics to a spatial error model with spatially
weighted covariates, the authors nd that many neighboring states attributes, including
environmental stringency, inuence FDI location.
The second strand of literature considers outows of FDI from a single home country
to one or more host countries at the aggregated or industrial level. Most results in this
type of studies are mixed and sometimes not very robust across specications. Evidence
suggests that stringer environmental policy in the United State leaded to an increase
in FDI outows, but not necessarily toward developing countries and industries with
1This evidence is partially in line with Zeng and East (2007) who nd that openness to trade and
FDI allocation in China has lead to an improve in environmental quality trough technology spillovers.
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high costs of pollution abatement (Xing and Kolstad (2002), Eskeland and Harrison
(2003), Hanna (2006), Cole and Elliot (2005), MacDermott (2006), Kellenberg (2007)).
Surprisingly, the evidence obtained by Kirkpatrick and Shimamoto (2007) suggest that
outward Japanese FDI is attracted to countries which have a transparent, stable and
stringent regulatory environment. This result was partially corroborated by Elliott and
Shimamoto (2008), who nd that stringer regulation in Japan has discouraged japanese
pollution-intensive industries to allocate FDI to the Philippines and Malaysia. More
recently, Wagner and Timmins (2008) nd that the German chemical industry is the
only pollution-intensive sectors in Germany to have relocated to countries with less
stringent regulation once agglomeration e¤ect are taken into account.
Last but not least, the third strand of literature analyzes inows of FDI to di¤erent
countries originating from various home countries at the aggregated, industrial or rm
level. In this type of studies, the evidence of a pollution haven a¤ect is quasi non-existent
(Ratnayake and Widewald (1998), Smarzynska and Wei (2001), Eskeland and Harrison
(2003), Mihci et al. (2005), Koop and Tole (2008)), although recent studies nd a
signicant PHE (Sparatenu (2007), Dam and Scholtens (2008)). In order to validate the
pollution haven e¤ect, Ho¤mann et al. (2005) study whether FDI / pollution Granger
cause pollution / FDI using new techniques in Granger causality with short time series
and panel data. Their results suggest that a pollution haven e¤ect is more likely to
happen in low-income host countries. More recently, Cole and Fredriksson (2006) and
Cole, Elliot and Fredriksson (2006) examine whether the e¤ects of FDI on environmental
policies is conditioned on the structure of host countriespolitical institutions. They
show that environmental policy should be treated as endogenous with respect to FDI
in order to assess correctly the pollution haven e¤ect. Their results suggest that the
e¤ects of FDI on the environmental policy are conditional on the governments degree
of corruptibility and sensitivity to lobbies. More precisely, pollution havens are more
likely to occur in countries with few legislative units and low government honesty, which
characterizes most low-income countries. In line with this nding, Dam and Scholtens
(2008) show that rms with good (poor) social responsibility2 tend to invest less (more)
in countries where environmental regulation is weak.
2.3 Weakness of Existing Empirical Literature
While most empirical papers nd a negative pollution haven e¤ect at the regional and
industrial level, this little evidence disappears once data are considered in an inter-
country analysis. Thus, the existing empirical studies on pollution haven e¤ect can be
summarized in two ways (Smarzynska and Wei (2001). Either the pollution haven e¤ect
is just a popular myth that does not hold in reality, or the pollution haven e¤ect is valid
but the empirical research has so far failed to uncover this "dirty secret". In reality, the
existing empirical literature faces a number of limitations, which may partially explain
the ambiguity in the results obtained (Ederington et al (2005), Elliott and Schimamoto
(2008)). These limitations include:
2Corporate social responsability is viewed as the extent to which a rm internalizes market costs.
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- Conceptual frameworks: most studies apply a di¤erent conceptual framework
(gravity model, location decision model, reduced cost function, . . . ) but have
a common feature: they dont distinguish between the di¤erent forms FDI can
take. As mentioned earlier, some types of FDI are more sensitive to environmental
stringency than other (see Table 1). Therefore assuming a homogenous response
in environmental stringency may inadvertently mask the overall impact of more
stringent regulations by pooling una¤ected and a¤ected FDI.
- Data sources and proxies: it is very hard to quantify environmental stringency
in di¤erent host and home countries and most papers use di¤erent proxies. This
di¢ culty is further exacerbated by the fact that the regulation in the book is not
necessary the same as the one actually enforced (Smarzynska and Wei (2001). If
strict environmental laws are not enforced, they are not e¤ective and similar to
lower regulation. More generally, most studies use cost-based measures of envi-
ronmental stringency which usually raises a specication error due to unobserved
foreign pollution taxes (Copeland and Taylor (2004), Levinson and Taylor (2008)).
More generally, this data problem is important because, as pointed out by Wheeler
(2001), the costs associated with environmental stringency constitute a small frac-
tion of production costs in virtually every industry. Failure to measure accurately
environmental stringency may mask the real negative pollution haven e¤ect.
- Di¤erences in econometric methodologies: while some papers apply cross-
section regressions, logit and probit models, and others use GMM estimators with
random or xed e¤ects, they all have to deal with unobserved heterogeneity, vari-
able omissions, aggregation bias and endogeneity. Cross-section analyses cannot
control for unobserved heterogeneity among countries (Keller and Levinson (2002),
Levinson and Taylor (2008)). Failure to take into account important determinants,
such as third-country e¤ects, agglomeration e¤ects and relative factor abundance
will lead to omitted variables bias which can mask the true pollution haven e¤ect.
The estimations will be also biased, if one does not correct for the potential endo-
geneity of environmental with respect to FDI. Beside a high degree of corruptibility
and lobby pressures, the endogeneity of pollution regulation might prevail if the
host countries set their regulation strategically to stimulate FDI or if they impose
stricter regulation once they receive too much investment in polluting industries.
Therefore, the choice of the correct estimator is essential.
The conceptual framework, data and methodology used in this study are intended
to address a number of these di¢ culties. First, we follow the third strand of literature
by analyzing the pollution haven e¤ect at the world-wide level. Since the pollution
haven e¤ect is more likely to be the result of di¤erences in environmental stringency
between developed and developing countries, we examine bilateral FDI ows using a
new extended OECD investment database which covers a large number of developed
and developing host countries as well as a long sample period (1981-2005). Second,
following Blonigen et al. (2007), we consider a conceptual framework that allows us to
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highlight the potential importance of export-platform and complex FDI. Accounting for
the presence of spatial dependence in FDI decisions and environmental stringency might
be important to reduce variables omission in the model specication. Third, we use
di¤erent complementary measures of environmental stringency. Each proxy used in this
study relies on di¤erent underlying assumptions, which allows to take into account the
di¤erent facets of environmental stringency. Last but not least, we provide a thorough
treatment to simultaneity, endogeneity bias and spatial characteristics of the data, by
applying GMM-SYS to a spatial gravity-like model.
To our knowledge, this is the rst attempt to measure the pollution haven e¤ect in
an inter-country bilateral FDI panel setting which covers most developed and developing
countries by controlling for relevant host countrys FDI determinants and exploring spa-
tial features of the data. This is also the rst time, the prevalence of inows of complex
FDI is being estimated for more than one parent country. By focusing on a countrys
aggregated bilateral FDI, we are aware that results can sometimes be misleading and
hard to prove by masking heterogeneous patterns at the rm or industry-level. There-
fore, we should interpret our results cautiously even if we try to reduce this aggregation
bias by exploiting fully the information available. In any case, an inter-country analysis
remains relevant to get the "big picture" in terms of FDIs spatial allocation. It can
also be of particular interests to policymakers in developing countries who compete to
attract new FDI.
3 Model Specication
This section presents the baseline model and its spatial extension in order to account
for third-country e¤ects. The di¤erent spatial weight matrices are presented as well as
the selected variables. Finally, the estimation procedure is discussed.
3.1 Gravity-Like Model
Given the relative success of the traditional gravity equation in explaining the trade
ow between countries, recent theoretical models (Markusen et al. (1996), Head and
Ries (2008)) suggest that location and size of bilateral FDI ows depend on country
characteristics such as country size, population and factor endowments. According to
Evenett and Keller (2002), the gravity model can support both assumptions of product
di¤erentiation (increasing returns to scale) and homogenous good production. This
can explain why this approach has been widely used in empirical studies of FDI, see
for example Benassi-Quéré et al. (2007) or Stein and Daude (2007). Therefore, we
also model bilateral FDI ows in a gravity-like setting. We extend the set of standard
gravity variables by adding classical FDI determinants, in order to capture all potentially
relevant determinants of FDI (Blonigen (2005), Campos and Kinoshita (2003), Lall
(2003)). However, given that our priority is to identify the presence of any pollution
haven e¤ect, we control for most variables related to cost-motivated (vertical) FDI.
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Ignoring spatial dependences, the baseline model reads as follows
FDIijt = FDIijt 1 + P
0
it+H
0
jt +X
0
ijt + 'ij + t + uijt (1)
where FDIijt is FDI ow from home country i to host country j at period t. Pit is a
vector including parent country variables, Hjt includes host variables and Xijt represent
bilateral control variables. 'ij is the individual e¤ect, that captures unobserved char-
acteristics related to country-pair, which do inuence bilateral FDI but are xed in the
short and medium terms. The time xed e¤ect, t, captures the business cycle common
to countries. Finally, uijt is the error term.
We specify our model in log-linear form (except for dummies variables) because,
as documented by Blonigen et al. (2004) and (2005), such a model more likely leads
to well-behaved residuals given the skewness of most FDI data samples. Such a log-
linear model also allows to interpret the coe¢ cients associated with log variables as
elasticities. A problem that arises when using a log-linear specication is how to deal
with observations with negative and zero values. This the case for FDI inows which
are negative when the home country repatriates previous investments made in the host
country. There are usually two ways to handle the presence of zero/negative FDI ows.
The rst one consists of discarding the zero and negative observations from the sample.
This strategy is correct as long as the zero and negative values are randomly distributed.
However, if they are not random, as is usually the case, then the problem of selection
bias arises. This problem is often ignored in applied work, but could be handled by using
sample selection correction. The second approach consists of transforming the variable
by adding a constant factor to each observation on the dependent variable. This is what
we do when we applied the following log transformation to variables with negative or
zero values: z = ln(x+ 2
p
x2 + 1) (Busse et al. (2007)). The sign of x is unchanged, but
the values of x pass from a linear scale at small absolute values to a logarithmic scale
at large values by using this transformation.
3.2 Spatial Gravity-Like Model
One potential drawback of equation (1) is the reliance on a two-countries framework. In
order to account for the presence of more complex and integrated FDI, it is necessary
to consider bilateral FDI as spatial data. A general spatial model can be described as
follows:
FDIijt =  [W1tFDIit]ijt + FDIijt 1 + P
0
it+H
0
jt +X
0
ijt + S
0
jt + 'ij + t + "ijt
"ijt =  [W2t"it]ijt + uijt (2)
where W1t and W2t are spatial weight matrices which are non-stochastic and ex-
ogenous to the model, [W1tFDIijt]ijt represents the spatially weighted average of FDI
ow from home country i to the neighborhood countries of country j, while[W2t"it]ijt
measures how bilateral FDI from home country i to host j can be a¤ected by a shock
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to FDI from source i in surrounding host countries The vector S
0
jt includes spatially
weighted host variables to account for potential spillovers (e.g. market potential). By
adding some restrictions to the parameters, two popular spatial model specications can
be derived from this general spatial model: the spatial lag model ( = 0) and the spatial
error model ( = 0).
Since we are particularly interested in the detection of a substitutive or comple-
mentary allocation of FDI between host countries, we follow Blonigen et al. (2007)
and consider a spatial lag model which accounts directly for the spatial relationships
between bilateral FDI ows. As mentioned by Garretsen et al. (2008), the inclusion
of a spatial lag dependent variable as a foundation in economic theory (complex FDI),
while FDI theory provides no real guidance whether or not to expect positive or negative
spatial autocorrelation in a spatial error model. Moreover, from an econometric point of
view, the omission of spatially weighted variables leads to variables omission and biased
estimator. The spatial error model is of secondary interest, because, although it may
improve standard errors, it does not a¤ect point estimates. In other words, the omission
of a spatial error structure has less implication in terms of biasness than the omission of
a spatial dependent variable3. The spatial gravity-like model, also known as "time-space
simultaneous model" (Anselin (1999)), reads as follows:
FDIijt =  [WtFDIit]ijt+ FDIijt 1+P
0
it+H
0
jt+X
0
ijt+S
0
jt+'ij +t+uijt (3)
The spatial lag term () allows to determine if FDI ow from country i to country
j is (positively/negatively) a¤ected by FDI from country i to other neighboring host
countries. In other words, the spatial lag  captures the impact of FDI from third
country k into j on FDI from home country i into j. The coe¢ cient  is assumed to lie
between -1 and +1.
Independently of the spatial model considered, the spatial linkages of the observa-
tions are measured by dening a spatial weight matrix, denoted by Wt for any year t.
This spatial weight matrix allows to measure the potential third-country e¤ects between
neighborhood locations:
Wt =
0BBBB@
0 wt(dk;j)    wt(dk;l)
wt(dj;k) 0    wt(dj;l)
...
...
. . .
...
wt(dl;k) wt(dl;j)    0
1CCCCA
where wt(dj;k) denes the functional form of the weights between any two pair of
location j and k. The diagonal elements of the square matrixWt are set to zero so that no
observation of bilateral FDI predicts itself. In the construction of the weights themselves,
the theoretical foundation for wt(dj;k) is quite general and the particular functional form
of any single element inWt is, therefore, not prescribed. In fact, the determination of the
3We performed robust lagrange multiplier tests for the spatial error and spatial lag dependence
specications. In both cases, the tests were not conclusive.
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proper specication of Wt is one of the most di¢ cult and controversial methodological
issues in spatial data analysis. Prior to discussing the weighting scheme used, it is
important to note that a misspeciation of the weighting matrix can bias the results.
In practice, di¤erent weight matrices should be compared to nd the most proper one.
A general spatial matrixWt can be dened by a symmetric binary contiguity matrix.
This weighting scheme assigns a weight of zero to non-contiguous countries and a weight
of one to all contiguous countries (Drukker and Millimet (2007)):
wt(dj;k) =
(
1 if j and k are contiguous
0 otherwise.
Since the contiguity matrix cannot di¤erentiate the degree of spatial linkages be-
tween adjacent locations, some more complex spatial weighting matrix can be used. For
example, one can choose a simple inverse distance function, where each pair of location
j and k declines to
wt(dj;k) =
1
dj;k
if j 6= k:
However, the inverse distance matrix has the disadvantage of always giving some
positive weight to very remote countries (with weaker cultural, political and economic
ties). A compromise can be reached by allowing the "third-country" e¤ects to decay
at a faster rate by giving more weight to locations within the same region4 and almost
zero to locations outside the region (Blonigen et al (2006)). This is done by dividing the
distance between locations j and k by the minimum distance within the region r (where
location j lies within region r):
wt(dj;k) = exp
  dj;k
MINr;j

if j 6= k:
As distances are time-invariant, it will generally be the case that Wt =Wt+1. How-
ever, when dealing with unbalanced panel data, this is no longer true (Egger et al.
(2005)). Missing neighborhood observations are problematic because they are treated
as zeros. This may likely induce bias in the estimation and interpretation of the results.
According to Baltagi et al. (2005), this constitutes an important issue for future re-
search. However this "border problem" should be smaller with a distance-based weight-
ing scheme and large averages distances between locations than for contiguity-based
weighting schemes. Since this practical issue is usually neglected, there is no universal
solution to overcome this practical problem. One solution is to only consider spatially
weighted observations without any missing neighborhood locations (i.e. balanced panel).
The main disadvantage of this approach is to reduce drastically the information available
and the sample size. Another solution is to compare the results of di¤erent spatial tests
(i.e. Moran I and Gearys C ) with and without missing neighborhood locations. These
spatial tests should be sensitive enough to detect any spatial bias due to the inclusion of
zero-value observations. Thus, if both results give the same conclusion, one can include
4Six geographical regions are considered in this study: (1) North America; (2) Latin America and
Caribbean; (3) Europe and Central Asia; (4) East Asia, Pacic and South Asia; (5) Sub-Saharan Africa;
(6) Middle East and North Africa.
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missing neighborhood locations observations, although some bias will remain. In an
unbalanced panel setting, with a sample size of t to T periods, the full weight matrix,
W, is given by:
W =
0BBBBB@
Wt 0    0
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0    0 WT
1CCCCCA
As is standard in spatial econometrics, for ease of interpretation, the weighting ma-
trix W is row standardized so that each row in W sums to one.
3.3 Variables Selection
The dependent variable of the model is the bilateral ows of FDI from 26 OECD coun-
tries to 146 host countries5 for the period 1981 through 2005. The data, expressed
in current US dollars, is taken from OECD International Direct Investment Statistics
website. Working on ows rather than stocks provides several advantages including
more available data and less error measurements, although stocks present less volatility
than ows and constitute a better measure of capital ownership (Bénassy-Quéré et al.
(2007)).
In developing an empirical model on FDI to test for the pollution haven e¤ect (equa-
tion (1) and equation (3)), we need to consider three issues:
1. What are the determinants of bilateral FDI? This study emphasizes on the
macro determinants of FDI. That is why, we focus on the factors that drive FDI
to countries, abstracting from its sectoral division with an emphasis on vertical
FDI factors. The classical determinants include market demand, growth rate, ag-
glomeration e¤ect, factor endowments, natural resources and trade and investment
impediments.
2. How to deal with the fact that the environmental quality is not directly
observed? To capture the strength of environmental regulations in host coun-
tries, we adopt three di¤erent measures that complement one another, SO2 per
capita emission, co2 per capita emission and the number of ratied international
environmental treaties.
2. How to assess third-country e¤ects associated with some determinants
of FDI? To account for these spatial interactions, we consider spatially weighted
third-country determinants of FDI, since this spatial correlation among host coun-
tries is mainly related to MNEs activities between themselves.
5Appendix 7.A. lists the host and source countries. Note that countries with a population lower than
a million of inhabitants have been dropped in order to exclude tax haven countries (e.g. Bahamas).
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3.3.1 Classical FDI Determinants
As mentioned earlier, we include classical macroeconomic determinants of FDI in order
to reduce any potential bias related to variables omission. The variables selection is
mainly dictated by data availability. All monetary variables are expressed in US dollars.
Appendix 7.B lists the variables considered and their sources.
The demand market size of a host countrys allows multinationals to exploit economies
of scale and specialize in standard productions, which ultimately lead to cost minimiza-
tion and market growth. Therefore, market size inuences positively inows of FDI and
is usually considered as the single most important factor in the investment location de-
cision of the rm. Following Benassy-Quéré et al. (2007), market demand is measured
by the host countrys real GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP). We also
include the source countrys real GDP in PPP as in a standard gravity equation. The
use of GDP in PPP instead of conventional GDP at exchange rates comes from the fact
that the latter tends to understate the purchasing power of currencies in low-income
economies.
FDI ows are part of a virtuous circle (Investment Development Path). FDI is
attracted by fast economic growth and contributes signicantly to economic growth,
which in turn leads to higher economic growth rate and FDI attraction. Growth rate
is measured by the growth rate of real (per capita) GDP, because it can indicate the
future size of the host countrys market, rising productivity and protability.
FDI is usually characterized by agglomeration e¤ects: more FDI in a host country
seems to attract more FDI in this same host country. This persistence e¤ect is partly due
to the fact that FDI is often accompanied by physical investments that are irreversible
in the short run. These agglomeration e¤ects can also lead to congestion, when rms
compete with one another through price bidding to downstream industries in the region.
However, due to data limitations and di¢ culties in obtaining denite statistical speci-
cations, empirical evidence measuring agglomeration e¤ects is limited. In this study,
agglomeration e¤ect is measured by lagged FDI inows, since the inclusion FDI stocks
led to multicollinearity problems. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable turns
the model into a dynamic panel model (Waldkirch and Gonipath (2008), Wagner and
Timmins (2008)). This lagged FDI can also partially capture infrastructure in the host
country. High physical (e.g. roads and power) and social (e.g. health and education)
infrastructure as well as urbanization inuence positively inows of FDI.
Since an important part of FDI is a¤ected to service sectors (UNCTAD (2004)),
we want to account for the structure of the economy. Following Cole and Fredriksson
(2006), we include the manufacturing value-added as a percentage of total GDP, in order
to capture the degree to which an economy consists of pollution intensive manufacturing
industries. Keeping in mind that it is not necessarily the most polluting industries which
will be a¤ected by stringer environmental regulation (due to high sunk costs), the sign
of the coe¢ cient can be zero or positive, if the marginal pollution damage from domestic
production rises.
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Following Eskeland and Harrison (2003), which show the importance of the capital-
labor ratio in determining the likeliness of a country to become a pollution haven, we
also include a skill variable (factors endowment), namely the labor-capital ratio, taken
from Penn World Tables.
According to FDI theory, natural resources generate macroeconomic uncertainty
and as a consequence crowds out FDI for two reasons (Asiedu and Lien (2004)). First,
an increase in natural resources will generate ination by increasing the demand in
the nontradeable sector. Second, natural resources (especially oil) are characterized by
bursts and booms, which tends to increase exchange rate volatility. Higher ination
and exchange rate volatility increase macroeconomic uncertainty and as a consequence
discourage inows of FDI. The negative relationship between natural resources and FDI
ows may also be explained by the fact that while natural resources exploration requires
a large initial investment, the continuing operations requires a small cash ow. Thus,
after the initial phase, FDI may be staggered. The natural resources variable is proxied
by a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for the 20 host countries with greatest
oil reserves in 2006. Another dummy variable for countries with high reserve in natural
gas was included in the initial model specication, but had to me dropped because of
multicollinearity.
When proximity and contiguity advantages between source and host country (allow-
ing to avoid transport costs) outweigh the concentration advantages (increasing returns
to scale), rms will choose FDI. Close cultural environment (including old colonies) has
also a positive e¤ect on inows of FDI (Benassy-Quéné et al. (2007)). Following Stein
and Daude (2007), we consider the bilateral distance (dened as the great circle distance
between the countriescapitals, as well as a contiguity (1 if both countries are adjacent),
colony (1 for any colonial relationship) and common language (1 for common o¢ cial of
primary language) dummy variables. Note that the distance and contiguity variables are
also used to create the 3 di¤erent spatial weight matrices (contiguity, inverse distance
and exponential distance) dened in the previous section.
Trade barriers can a¤ect FDI in multiple ways. In order to avoid obstacles in trade
caused by a tari¤, foreign rms can have an incentive to invest in the country to which it
is di¢ cult to export because of tari¤ barriers (tari¤ jumping FDI). Thus, a reduction
of import barriers deters tari¤-jumping FDI, but may encourage vertical FDI by mak-
ing the imports of inputs and machinery easier. Vertical FDI and (non-tari¤-jumping)
horizontal FDI is also stimulated by lower export barriers, because the re-export of
processed goods is facilitated and the expansion of the e¤ective market size improves
business climate and expectation of long-term economic growth. The economic integra-
tion is measured here by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is a ratied
bilateral or regional agreement trade (RAT) between the source and host country, 0
otherwise (MacDermott (2006), Stein and Daude (2007)). Note that this dummy vari-
able can vary over time. It will be 0 for the period before the conclusion of the trade
agreement and 1 afterwards.
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Capital barriers, by their very nature, are di¢ cult to measure, since they can take
many forms. Moreover, the e¤ect of trade and capital controls depend of the kind of
distortions they create (Asiedu et al. (2004)). One usually distinguishes between ad-
ministrative or direct controls/barriers and market based or indirect controls/barriers.
While direct controls restrict capital transactions, market-based controls include mul-
tiple exchange rate systems, other indirect regulatory controls which a¤ect trade and
capital transactions indirectly by increasing the costs associated with trade and capital
movements. Although there exist obvious di¢ culties in measuring capital liberalization,
a general positive relationship between a liberal capital regime and FDI, is anticipated
(Desai et al. (2006)), Urata et al. (2007)). Following Noy et al. (2007), we use the
Ito-Chinn index, which measures the countrys regulatory degree of capital account
openness. It is based on the binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation of re-
strictions on cross-border nancial transactions reported in the IMFs Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
FDI depends also on the countrys marketing e¤orts to attract foreign investment.
In order to capture this investment promotion e¤ect, we create a dummy variables for
bilateral investments treaties (BIT), which Egger and Pfa¤ermayr (2004) have found to
a¤ect FDI. The initial model specication also included a dummy variable accounting for
the existence of a capital tax treaties between the source and host countries (di Giovanni
(2005)). Unfortunately, the variable had to be dropped because of multicollinearity with
BIT and RAT.
3.3.2 Environmental Stringency
As mentioned previously, simply stated, the pollution haven e¤ect (PHE) refers to the
result of prot-seeking multinational rms relocating their production processes to coun-
tries which have less stringent environmental regulations. Therefore, its focus is on the
di¤erence between environment policy instruments across countries and how this a¤ects
capital and trade ows (Ederington and Minier (2003), Bommer (1999)). In practice,
measuring environmental stringency is the key problem in this literature (van Soest et
al. (2006)). What one wants to know is how much more costly production is in a
given country relative to others, due to the countrys environmental regulations. These
environmental compliance costs could take many forms (Levinson and Taylor (2008)):
environmental fees or taxes, permitting costs, regulatory delays, emissions limits that
require installation of costly technology, the threat of lawsuits, product or process re-
design, forgone output, and so forth. The relative environmental stringency of a host
country is proxied here by three complementary measures.
The level of sulphur dioxide SO2 emissions per capita constitutes a good measure
of air pollution. The major limitation of this variable is that SO2 emissions may re-
ect environmental stringency in a narrow way. Moreover, just like CO2 emissions,
SO2 series are constructed from fuel consumption data, rather than directly observed
(Wagner and Timmins (2008)). Despite this, SO2 emissions constitutes a good proxy
for environmental policy. First, SO2 per capita is one of the most signicant pollutants
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worldwide. Milner et al. (2006) show that the reduction in SO2 emission is highly cor-
related with the level of environmental funds in former Soviet Union countries. Second,
it is highly correlated with other pollutants (Xing and Kolstad (2002), MacDermott
(2006)). Third, to the extend that pollution reduction is a public good, it su¤ers less
from a "free-ride problem" and is available for a large number of host countries. That is
the reason why, environmental stringency will be proxied by the log of SO2 per capita
emissions multiplied by -1.
Air pollution can also be measured by the level of carbon dioxide CO2 emissions
(Ratnayake et al. (1998), Ho¤man et al. (2005)). Reductions in emissions may be
viewed as proxies for a host countrys e¤ective enforcement of environmental policies.
The use of CO2 emissions as a proxy relies on strong assumptions. Some critics argue
that CO2 emissions do not reect only environmental stringency, but also the energy
intensity of production. Another problem lies in the fact that the pollution consequences
of CO2 emissions are subject to the "free-ride problem" because the damages caused
by CO2 emissions are global. There are fewer incentives for a government to modify
its environmental policy, which makes it di¢ cult to use CO2 emissions as a proxy for
environmental stringency. Therefore, we expect to nd less evidence of a PHE with CO2
per capita emissions.
The number of participation in international environmental treaties can also consti-
tute a cross-country proxy, although its use relies on several strong assumptions. First,
one implicitly assumes that a ratied treaty will automatically translate into stringer
environmental stringency. This would probably be true if there were sanctions for the
non-respect of the treaty. Second, each country which signs a treaty will implement the
exact same instruments in terms of cost and mechanism to comply with the regulation,
which is unrealistic. Therefore, we expect to nd less evidence of a pollution haven
e¤ect when considering environmental treaties. Following Xing and Kolstad (1998) as
well as Smazynska and Wei (2001) and Kirkpatrick and Shimamoto (2005) we construct
a variable of environmental treaties that report the number of signed treaties.
Other measures of environmental stringency are used in the literature. Lead-content
per gallon of gasoline is considered as a very good dynamic proxy for industry environ-
mental regulations at the country level, not only for its data availability, but correlation
with other measures of industry environmental regulations (Cole et al. (2006), Hilton
(2006)). First, the authorized content of lead in gasoline is the result from a policy deci-
sion. Second, as a local air pollutant, lead emissions has signicant health implications,
and therefore control of such emissions constitutes an explicit environmental objective.
The major drawback of this proxy is that it is only available for 1983-1995. Toward the
end of the nineties, most countries including developing ones, switched to gasoline with
zero lead content6. As a consequence lead is no longer a relevant comparison measure.
Other environmental proxies can unfortunately not be considered because of their lack of
availability in terms of time period or/and covered countries (e.g. pollution intensities;
6The countries that have phased out leaded gasoline, as of January 2002, includes most developed
countries (United States, Canada, ...) but also less developed ones (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India,
Bangladesh, Vietnam, Egypt, ... (source: http://www.unep.org/pcfv/resources/leaded.asp).
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water pollution (BOD); fertilizer; WEFs environmental sustainability index (Wagner et
al. (2007)); index of environmental sensitivity performance (Cagatay et al.(2006), Mihci
et al. (2005)); number of deaths related to pollution; number of environmental NGOs,
number of iso 14001 licences).
Independently of the proxy used, we hypothesize a negative relationship between
environmental stringency and FDI. Higher environmental standards (ambient quality
standards, emission standards, production process standards and products standards)
leading to higher environmental costs can deter inows of FDI. However, it is also
possible that environmental stringency can attract FDI in order to gain a competi-
tive advantage through higher standards, which would validate the factor endowment
hypothesis (Chudnovsky and Lopez (1999)). As mentioned in the literature review, pre-
vious studies (Ederington et al. (2003), Fredriksson et al. (2006), Kellenberg (2007),
He et al. (2007)) suggest that not only FDI is sensitive to environmental stringency,
but also that environmental policy can be a¤ected by FDI, when the level of corruption
and lobby pressures are high or when environmental standards are used as a strategic
trade policy. In both cases, this could lead the government to set higher or lower level of
environmental policy than it is socially e¢ cient. As a result, environmental stringency
has to be treated as (potentially) endogenous.
3.3.3 "Third-Country" E¤ects
In order to account for the role of spatial dependence and interaction in the data, we
include spatially weighted variables. Each spatial variable is computed using the same
spatial weight matrix (contiguity, inverse distance or negative exponential distance).
For sake of brevity, we only present the results associated with negative exponential
distance.
Following Blonigen et al. (2007), the estimation of complex integration strategies of
multinationals is done by including a spatial lag bilateral FDI and a variable capturing
market potential in neighboring host countries. To capture the fact that FDI from home
country i to host country j a¤ects FDI from i to host k and vice-versa, we include a
spatial autoregression term: [WtFDIit]ijt =
P
k 6=j wt(dk;j)  FDIikt.
The second variable is a measure of the host country proximity to its neighborhood
markets. According to Head and Mayer (2004), which applied di¤erent measures of host
country market proximity in their analysis of Japanese outbound FDI into Europe, a
distance-weighted sum of close countriesGDPs yields the best t for the data. Thus, for
a given host country j in year t, the market potential variable is dened as the spatially
weighted sum of GDPs of all other countries: [WtGDPt]jt =
P
k 6=j wt(dk;j) GDPkt.
To account for the fact that countries do not dene environmental regulation in-
dependently (Eliste et al. (2001), Drukker et al. (2007)), we also include a spatially
weighted environmental stringency that capture the spatial interdependence of environ-
mental stringency: [WtEnv:Stringencyt]j =
P
k 6=j wt(dk;j)  Env:Stringencykt. The
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inclusion of this additional spatial variable is particularly important when one consid-
ers SO2 per capita emission as a proxy. According to the geographical location and
prevailing wind patterns, levels of acid deposition from SO2 in one country is partially
determined by emissions in neighboring countries. As a consequence, any country will
have an incentive to behave strategically with respect to emissions originating in neigh-
boring countries (Perkins et al. (2008)). Empirical evidence suggests also that the
propensity of a given host country to ratify treaties is positively correlated with the
number of treaties signed in the neighborhood countries (Davies et al. (2006)).
To check the presence of spatial correlation (i.e. coincidence of value similarity and
locational similarity), we perform two of the most popular global spatial indicators:
Moran I (1948) and Gearys C (1954) statistics7 (Anselin (1999)). Appendix 7.E. pro-
vides the results of the Moran and Geary tests for bilateral FDI, GDP and environmental
stringency (proxied by SO2 per capita and international treaties). The null hypothesis
of no spatial correlation is rejected by both tests for most years for each variable across
di¤erent spatial weight schemes. More precisely, the results suggest the presence of pos-
itive spatial autocorrelation for each variable. In order to account for this signicant
presence of spatial dependence in each variable, it seems justify to include their spatially
weighted counterparts.
Based on the prevailing type of FDI, the expected sign of the spatially weighted
variables will be di¤erent (see Table 1). Note that the use of data at the country
level can only capture net e¤ects. For instance, the spatial lag coe¢ cient may be on
average not di¤erent from zero but this could simply be the result of export-platform
and complex vertical FDI e¤ects cancelling out.
3.4 Econometric Issues
The spatial lag model (equation (3)) is usually estimated using maximum likelihood
(ML) or generalized method of moments methods (GMM) (Anselin (1999), Elhorst
(2003), (Kapoor et al. (2007)). In fact, one can analytically demonstrate that the spatial
lag term W  FDI is correlated with the disturbances, even if u are independently and
identically distributed8. Each element of FDI, depends on a linear combination of all
of the error terms. Equation (3) faces simultaneity and endogeneity problems, which in
turn means that OLS estimation will be biased and inconsistent. Therefore, the spatial
lag term must be treated as an endogenous variable and proper estimation methods
must account for this endogeneity.
Spatial econometrics suggest to solve this problem by estimating a reduced form of
the model using maximum likelihood. Elhorst (2003) developed a rst-di¤erenced model
7The Getis and Ord (1992) statistics cannot be computed for all variables of interest in our study,
since they can only be applied to positive attribute value (FDI inows can be negative for instance).
8To see this point more formally, note that equation (3) can be rewritten as follows in matrix notation:
FDI = (I   W ) 1 (FDI 1 + S+H +X + S + '+ + u)
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to eliminate xed e¤ects and then derived an unconditional likelihood function. He
claims that his estimation method is superior to GMM estimator. The main drawback
of his method is that, while the serially lagged variable is considered endogenous, other
explanatory variables are not. Hence, if other FDI determinants are endogenous or
potentially endogenous, which is likely the case in our study9, no instrumental treatment
is applied to control for this econometric problem.
In this trade-o¤ situation, the system GMM estimator, developed by Arellano and
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), appears to be the best estimator, since it
can deal with the endogeneity of a big number of regressors at the same time. In partic-
ular, it corrects for the endogeneity of the spatial lagged dependent variable and other
potentially endogenous explanatory variables (Madriaga and Poncet (2007)). GMM-SYS
allows also to take into consideration some econometrics problems such as measurement
error and weak instruments. It also controls for time-invariant country-specic e¤ects
such as distance, culture and political structure. On a practical ground, it also avoids
the inversion of the high dimension spatial weights matrix W and the computation
of its eigenvalues, which can be sometimes computationally unfeasible to estimate the
model10.
The system GMM estimator consists of estimating equation (1) and (3) as a system
of two equations, one in levels and the other one in rst-di¤erences. Lagged rst-
di¤erences are treated as instruments for equations expressed in levels, while lagged
levels are used as instruments for equations in rst-di¤erences. The consistency of the
GMM-SYS estimator relies on the validity of the moment conditions, which depends on
the assumption of absence of serially correlation of the level residuals and the exogeneity
of the explanatory variables. Therefore, it is necessary to apply specication tests to
ensure that these assumptions are justied. Arellano and Bond (2001) suggest two
specication tests in order to verify the consistency of the GMM estimator. First, the
overall validity of the moment conditions is checked by the Sargan/Hansen test. The
null hypothesis is that instruments are not correlated with the residuals. The validity
of the moment conditions can also be evaluated with the Sargan/Hansen-di¤erence test,
which checks the validity of extra moment conditions over that of weak exogeneity. If
the Sargan-di¤erence test rejects the validity of these extra moment conditions, then
the strong assumption of strict exogeneity will be in doubt. Aware that too many
instrument variables (exceeding the number of groups) tend to validate invalid results
through the Hansen J test for joint validity of those instruments, as well as the di¤erence-
in-Sargan/Hansen tests for subsets of instruments, we will estimate GMM-SYS using
the collapse option of xtabond2 in Stata 10 (Roodman (2006) and (2007)), which
does not separate the instruments for each period.
9Beside the endogeneity issue related to omitted variables and the inclusion of a lagged dependent
variables (lagged FDI), estimation might also be biased, if one does not take into account the likely
endogeneity of environmental stringency and other explanatory variables (GDP, trade and capital bar-
rier,...) with respect to FDI ows (especially in developing countries where FDI can play a key role in
the national economic development (Cole and Fredrikson (2006)).
10 In our setting, the spatial weights matrix W is 20435 20435.
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In this study, the system-GMM estimation will rely on the following instruments
structure. The variables considered as endogenous (lagged FDI, environmental strin-
gency, spatial variables) are instrumented by their second and third lag as well as their
two and three lagged rst-di¤erence. The variables potentially endogenous and prede-
termined (host GDP, growth of GDP, countrys risk) receive the same treatment. To
account for the fact that the capital openness index is relatively constant over time,
we instrument it using its 5 rst lags only for the equation expressed in rst-di¤erence.
The capital-labour ratio and manufacturing variables are used as additional external
variables and treated as predetermined. GDP of the source country is treated as strictly
exogenous. The time xed e¤ects, the natural resources dummy as well as the gravity
variables (distance and colonial links) are also treated as strictly exogenous, but used
only in the rst-di¤erence specication. Following Xing and Kolstad (2002), we include
population density as an external exogenous variable. The latter is an indicator of con-
gestion and the ability of pollutants to naturally disperse away from population centers.
This instrument is unlikely to be correlated with the error term, that is why they are
used in level and rst-di¤erence. We also correct the standard errors for small sample
bias by applying the Windmeijer correction and using a two-step procedure.
4 Panel Estimation Results
Before performing tests and estimating the model, it is always interesting to proceed
at a graphical exploratory analysis of the relationship between inows FDI and envi-
ronmental stringency. Figure 1 depicts the spatial location of OECDs outbound FDI
to host countries and their level of environmental stringency proxied by the number of
international environmental treaties. First, it is interesting to note that most OECDs
FDI happen among OECD countries. Only a small fraction of FDI is allocated to less
developed countries. Among these countries, some countries like Brazil or China can
be considered as potential pollution haven countries, since they display a relatively low
environmental stringency but attract a large amount of FDI from OECD countries.
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FDI Flows and Environmental Stringency
Environmental Stringency
(International Treaties)
High Stringency
Laxer  Stringency
FDI inflows (in  USD)
Negative or Null
1 to 10 millions
10 to 100 millions
100 to 500 millions
500 to 1000 millions
More than 1 billion
Figure 1: Average inows FDI and environmental stringency (1981-2004)
Although most empirical FDI panel studies ignore the problem of non-stationarity,
we decide to check for stationarity of the variables included in the main regression
performing panel unit root tests. The need to exercise caution is emphasized when
dealing with panels of relative short time dimension as in our case. We perform rst-
generation (Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Maddala and Wu
(1999)) and second-generation (Pesaran (2004), Bai and Ng (2003), Choi test (2001))
panel unit roots11 since the Pesarans error cross-section dependence test (2004) indicates
that the bilateral FDI display cross-section dependence12. All panel unit root tests
considered here have non-stationarity for all individual series as a null hypothesis, but
di¤erent alternatives. The results, given in appendix 7.G, reject the null hypothesis of
non-stationarity for all individual series in most cases. The rejection of the null does
not imply that the entire panel is stationary. A Kao cointegration test (1999) was also
performed based test (appendix 7.F). It clearly rejects the hypothesis of non-stationarity
in the residuals. These results should however be considered cautiously, since there can
be considerable size distortions in panel unit root tests when spatial dependence exists
(Baltagi et al. (2007)). In any case, the use of GMM-SYS partially corrects for the non-
stationarity when estimating the rst-di¤erence equation. Moreover, when the number
of groups exceeds the sample period, the problems associated with non-stationarity are
mitigated.
11All panel unit root tests have been performed using Matlab. A lag of 5 was used for the tests
requiring the specication of the number of lags. All variables tested are expressed in logarithm and
level.
12The test statistic computed using residual from a model with individual e¤ects is equal to 12.04
and its p-value is 0.00. With a model including individual e¤ects and a trend, the CD statistic is 13.856
with a p-value of 0.00.
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We rst present the results associated with the full sample to determine potential
biases caused by omitting the spatial structure of the data and by not instrumenting
for environmental stringency (proxied by SO2 per capita emissions) and other poten-
tial endogenous variables. Then, since the motivation behind investment to developed
and developing countries may be quite di¤erent, we estimate models for OECD and
non-OECD host countries samples. The baseline model deliberately includes a limited
number of explanatory variables in order to avoid multicollinearity problems and a de-
crease in the sample size. The robustness check in the next section investigates the
inclusion of additional FDI determinants and the use of other proxies for environmental
stringency.
4.1 Baseline Results
Table 6 reports the results for the full sample (OECD and nonOECD host countries).
The rst three columns display the results without any spatial features for xed ef-
fects, random e¤ects and system-GMM respectively. The other four remaining columns
present the system-GMM estimations including third-country e¤ects (using a negative
inverse exponential distance). More precisely, we rst add the spatial lag dependent
variable, we then include separately the spatially weighted environmental stringency
and market potential variable, to nally consider the three spatially weighted variables
together. This sequence of specications allows us to study the sensitivity of the results
to the assumption of exogenous environmental stringency and the inclusion of third-
country e¤ects.
Despite the fact that most variables are signicant and display the expected sign
in the random e¤ect regression, the Hausman specication test suggests that the xed
e¤ect model is preferred over the random e¤ect specication. Overall, the estimates
associated with xed e¤ect are relatively poor. Only a few variables are signicant.
This should not come as a surprise since the xed e¤ect estimator does not correct for
the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable and environmental stringency. When
this issue is taken into account by instrumenting the lagged dependent variable and
environmental stringency, as GMM-SYS allows it, the results clearly improve. The es-
timated coe¢ cients usually lie between the ones from random and xed e¤ect. The
lagged bilateral FDI becomes signicant, while the coe¢ cient of environmental strin-
gency switches from positive to negative. The evidence suggests a positive endogenous
bias in the pollution haven e¤ect.
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More generally, the di¤erent specications associated with system-GMM seem ap-
propriately specied, since the Hansen test of the overidentifying restriction is passed
without any di¢ culties, the null hypothesis being robust estimator, but possibly weak-
ened by many instruments. The Sargan test of over-identication tests the null hypoth-
esis of absence of robustness but not weakened by too many instruments. As discussed
in Roodman (2006, 2007), having too many instruments in the regression can overt
the model and, at the same time, weakens the power of the Hansen test to detect overi-
dentication. Since we deliberately limited the number of instruments to be always
signicantly smaller than the number of groups (rule of thumb), we pay less attention
to the Sargan test. The Arellano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation in the
residuals (m2) cannot reject the null of no correlation by any standard levels of signif-
icance for all specications. The di¤erent model specications are, therefore, correctly
specied and instrumented.
The results show that the most important classical determinants of FDI have the
expected sign and are signicantly di¤erent from zero. In particular, the measure of
agglomeration e¤ect (lagged bilateral FDI) is signicant in all SYS-GMM specications
which is consistent with other empirical studies (Wagner and Timmins (2008) among
others). The host and source countriesGDP are signicant across all specication which
is fairly intuitive and in line with the claim that market size is the single most important
factor in the investment location decision. In other words, large home countries are
more likely to invest abroad, while large host countries are more likely to receive FDI.
The standard gravity variables (distance and colonial links) are clearly signicant across
specications, which is corroborated by Stein and Daude (2007). The negative coe¢ cient
for the distance variable is supportive of the prevalence of vertical-type of FDI.
The last three specications allow us to highlight the most prevailing type of FDI
from OECD countries (see Table 1). Since the spatial lag is positive and signicant and
the market potential is insignicant, complex FDI seem to be the most prevailing type
of FDI. However, one should be careful with the interpretation of these results. As noted
by Blonigen and Davies (2004) combining rich and poor countries in FDI data can lead
to implausible coe¢ cient estimates. The next section takes this issue into account.
4.2 OECD vs. Non-OECD Host Countries
Since the motivation behind investment to developed and developing countries may be
quite di¤erent, especially in the case of the PHE (Ho¤mann et al. (2005)), combining
FDI destined to developed and developing countries may introduce undesirable noise
into the data. In line with this consideration, we reestimate separately the di¤erent
model specications for two subsamples. Table 7 and 8 display the results for FDI to
high-income OECD and to non OECD countries13, respectively.
13Only high income OECD countries are dropped. Mexico, Turkey, Korea, Hungary, Poland, Czeck
Republic and Slovak Republic remain in the sample, since they can be considered as potential pollution
haven (Cole and Elliott (2005)) (see Appendix 7.A.).
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Overall, the comments made in the previous section can be reiterated for both tables.
Based on the Hausman test, the xed e¤ect model is preferred over the random e¤ect
model. The classical determinants of FDI are in most cases signicant with the expected
sign. Not correcting for potential endogeneity of environmental stringency yields a
di¤erent conclusion in each sub-sample. In the OECD host sample, the environmental
stringency has initially a positive e¤ect, but after correction it is no longer signicant.
In the non-OECD host sample, the endogeneity problem tends to mask the presence of
a negative and signicative pollution haven e¤ect. The fact that the pollution haven
e¤ect is always signicant for less developed countries is in line with the theory (Taylor
(2005)). It is further corroborated by the fact that the most prevailing type of FDI is
complex vertical integrated. Following Edgerington et al. (2005), the non-signicant
coe¢ cient of the value-added share of dirty industries can be attributed to the fact that
the most polluting industries are not necessarily the most likely to react to stringer
environmental regulation (due to high sunk costs for instance).
A positive and signicant spatial lag coe¢ cient and not signicant market potential
rule in favour of a higher prevalence of complex FDI from OECD countries toward less
developed host countries. There is also evidence of a complementary relationship in
the allocation of FDI to high income host countries. Note that these results di¤er from
the ndings of Blonigen et al. (2005). They found strong evidence of vertical FDI
from the United States to non-OECD countries and export platform FDI to developed
European countries. However, our ndings are in line with Garresten and Peeters (2008),
who highlight the presence of complex FDI for Dutch outbound FDI to developed and
developing host countries. In any case, one should be careful with comparisons, since
we consider not only one but several parent countries.
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5 Robustness Check
It is obviously relevant to ask to what extent our results are sensitive to the use of SO2
per capita as a proxy for environmental stringency14. Therefore, we re-estimate the
model using CO2 emission per capita and the number of international environmental
treaties as complementary proxies for the environmental stringency. Finally, we consider
the initial model specication and include additional FDI determinants to make sure that
the level of SO per capita emission does not capture other factors.
5.1 Additional Environmental Stringency Proxies
As mentioned previously, the use of CO2 per capita and international environmental
treaties as a proxy relies on stronger assumptions than SO2 per capita. Therefore,
we expect to nd less evidence of a pollution haven e¤ect when considering these two
proxies. Table 9 and 10 display the estimation results for the non-OECD host country
sample15. Note that the same instruments and lags structure as in the main results is
used to estimate the spatial model.
Most results found previously are also conrmed in table 9. One major di¤erence in
table 10 is the fact that the country risk index and the distance are now signicant. In
both tables, the results suggest the prevalence of complex FDI from OECD countries
to less developed countries. As table 9 documents it, the environmental stringency is
negative and signicant, only when we take into account the spatial structure of the
data. In other words, ignoring spatial dependence can mask the pollution haven e¤ect.
The reason why this happens for CO2 and not SO2 emissions is probably related to the
fact that carbon dioxide emissions are a more global air pollutant. The same kind of
pattern happens with international treaties. The PHE becomes signicant only when the
spatial model includes the spatially weighted environmental stringency variable. More
precisely, the allocation of FDI to a given host country is not only determined by the
environmental regulation in the host economy, but also by the environmental stringency
in the neighborhood countries. This nding is in line with the results of Davies and
Naughton (2006). They show that the participation to international environmental
treaties for non-OECD countries depends, among other factors, on the participation of
proximate similar countries. In any cases, this conrms once again the prevalence of
complex vertical FDI among OECD home countries. In order to integrate the di¤erent
intermediate production processes, the MNE considers a system of close countries rather
than a single host economy.
14We also estimated the model using SO2 per GDP to account for the economic activity. The results
were similar (i.e. signicant pollution haven e¤ect), although multicollinearity problems arose with host
and sources GDP.
15Appendix 7.E and 7.F report the results for OECD countries.
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The fact that there is less evidence of pollution haven e¤ect using international
environmental treaties should not come as a surprise. As mentioned previously, this last
proxy relies on stronger assumptions, which are less likely to hold for less developed
countries. The enforcement is weak because monitoring is lax or non-existent. Recent
empirical evidence suggests that MNEs are more sensitive to the enforcement of the
environmental policy than the level of stringency itself (Kellenberg (2007)). This nding
might even be more relevant, if we take into account the fact that decentralized local
governments tend to set or implement lower environmental standards in order to attract
mobile capital. This could partially explain why the correlation between SO2 per capita
emissions and the number of international treaties is not robust across the di¤erent
subsamples. For instance, it is positive for the OECD sample, while for the non-OECD
and full sample it is weakly negative. The use of environmental treaties leads also to
high collinearity with several variables (capital openness index and country risk index
among others), which could explain why environmental stringency is not signicant. It is
interesting to note that capital openness and ratication of international environmental
treaties are related, especially for small countries, in terms of diplomacy and willingness
to comply with international standards.
5.2 Additional FDI Determinants
Since the evidence of pollution haven e¤ect is less clear when we consider the levels of
CO2 per capita or the number of international environmental treaties as a measure of
environmental stringency, we have to make sure that the use of the level of SO2 per
capita emission does not capture other FDI determinants. The next table reports the
system-GMM estimations for the non-OECD sample by adding one by one additional
control to the set of the regressors16. This way we can detect any multicollinearity
problem. Note that the inclusion of some explanatory variables decreases signicantly
the sample size of the panel. Therefore, one should be cautious when comparing the
di¤erent results.
Overall, the inclusion of the remaining additional FDI determinants leave the re-
sults unchanged. Most of theses additional explanatory variables have the expected
sign but are not signicantly di¤erent from zero. The fact that environmental strin-
gency, proxied by SO2 per capita emission, remains negative and signicant, clearly
indicates that it does not capture any other factors. More precisely, the rst variable
considered is phone in order to capture the infrastructure level of the host economy. Its
inclusion does not alter the results. School Enrollment is used to account for human
capital. This variable is only available every 5 years. That is why it has been interpo-
lated. This variable is only available every 5 years. That is why it has been interpolated.
16Appendix 7.G reports the results for OECD countries.
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Its estimated coe¢ cient is signicantly positive but extremely high with respect to other
coe¢ cients. This usually happens when the variable doesnt exhibit a lot of time vari-
ation. This can also be caused by the fact that we already indirectly account for the
labour skill in the host economy when we use the capital-labor ratio as a GMM instru-
ment. In any case, the pollution haven e¤ect remains negative and signicantly. This is
also the case with the inclusion of a bilateral investment treaties and capital tax agree-
ments dummies, in order to account for the host countrys marketing e¤orts to attract
foreign investments. The literature considers the openness to trade as an important
FDI determinant, that is why we consider several measures. The rst proxy is a dummy
variable for the existence of regional agreements trade. The ratio of exports to GDP and
total exports are also used. An index to assess the level of free trade of the economy and
another one for the importance of trade tari¤ are considered. In all specications, the
associated coe¢ cient is not signicant. Despite the fact that the baseline model already
accounts for the level of corruption, through a countrys risk index nancial, economic
and political risks), we include an index of corruption. Note that the inclusion of this
index decreases the sample size by half. This could explain why the agglomeration ef-
fect is no longer signicant. The last two additional explanatory variables are part of
the classical gravity variables. Just like the other control variables, the contiguity and
common language dummies dont change the result of the other coe¢ cients. Therefore,
the evidence of the pollution haven e¤ect seems to be robust across specications.
6 Conclusion
This paper has examined whether environmental stringency in a host country has an
inuence on inows of FDI. In addition to traditional determinants of FDI, the model
included spatially weighted variables in order to account for "third-country" e¤ects. The
estimations were carried out on a sample of bilateral FDI from OECD countries to a
large number of host countries over the period 1981-2003. The use of System-GMM al-
lowed us to apply a thorough treatment to potential simultaneity, endogeneity bias and
spatial characteristics of the data. We showed the importance of correcting for the endo-
geneity of the environmental regulation. Most specications yield a signicant negative
relationship between environmental stringency and inows of FDI, once endogeneity
and spatial dependence are taken into account. This nding is robust across specica-
tions but also using di¤erent environmental stringency proxies. The ndings suggest the
prevalence of complex FDI between OECD countries and lower income countries. There
is also some evidence of a positive "third-country" e¤ect for environmental stringency.
Multinationals consider the environmental stringency of the host country as well as the
ones of the neighborhood countries. This can be interpreted as potential competition
between host countries in terms of environmental standard in order to attract FDI.
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The policy implications are not necessarily straightforward. Environmental strin-
gency can be used as an instrument to attract manufacturing multinationals. However,
the host country should be aware that they will mainly attract intermediate goods pro-
duction through complex FDI. In other words, they will be part of only a small part of
the production process, the most polluting one. In terms of economic development, this
is not necessarily the best way to ensure long term economic growth.
Although the ndings are largely plausible across specications, they should, be
taken with cautious. The proxies for environmental stringency are unfortunately still
imperfect and scarce. The use of a more reliable proxy for environmental stringency
would reduce the bias associated with the omission of variables. Another possible ex-
tension would be to estimate the specication using bilateral data at the industry level
in order to control more accurately for the polluting intensive composition e¤ect. Un-
fortunately, disaggregated bilateral FDI is scarce. It is only available for a few countries
and a few years. These are probably the main challenges the study of FDI-Pollution
Haven linkages at the world-wide level faces.
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7 Appendices
7.A Country Lists
Host Countries
Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria;
Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium-Luxemburg; Benin; Bolivia; Bosnia and
Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burkina; Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon;
Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Congo Rep.; Costa
Rica; Croatia; Cuba; Czech Republic; Côte dIvoire; Denmark; Dominican Republic;
Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Eritrea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Gabon; Gam-
bia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Haiti; Honduras; Hong
Kong; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jor-
dan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea Dem. Rep.; Korea Rep.; Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Lao;
Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; Libya; Lithuania; Macedonia; Madagascar; Malawi;
Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozam-
bique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nige-
ria; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philip-
pines; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russian Federation; Rwanda; Saudi; Arabia; Senegal;
Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Somalia; South Africa; Spain; Sri
Lanka; Sudan; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo;
Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab
Emirates; United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Vietnam;
Yemen;.Yugoslavia Former; Zambia; Zimbabwe.
Source Countries (OECD countries)
Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece;
Ireland; Italy; Japan; Korea, Rep.; Mexico; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Poland;
Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey; United; Kingdom; United States.
High Income OECD countries
Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece;
Ireland; Italy; Japan; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Spain; Sweden;
Switzerland; Turkey; United Kingdom; United States.
7.B Data Description
FDI Determinant Theory/Hypothesis Proxy Variable (Source) E¤ect
Market demand Market size GDP +
hypothesis (World Development Indicator)
Growth rate Di¤erential rates Real GDP Growth +
of return (World Development Indicator)
Agglomeration e¤ect Other Lagged FDI +
(OECD Database)
Industrial Structure Other Share of Manufacturing in total GDP +/-
(World Development Indicator)
Factor Endowments Factor endowments Capital/ Labour ratio +
hypothesis (World Penn Tables)
Trade Barriers Tari¤ jumping Dummy for Regional Trade Agreement +/-
hypothesis (WorldTradeLaw.net )
Capital Openness Other Ito-Chinn index +
http://web.pdx.edu/ito/
Investment Promotion Other Dummy for Bilateral Investment Treaties +
(UNCTAD)
Country Risk ICRG index -
(World Development Indicator)
Natural Resources Other Dummy for largest oil rich countries -
(www.eia.doe.gov)
Proximity Gravity Capitals distance -
hypothesis Contiguity, Colonies, Common Language +
(CEPII)
"Third-Country" E¤ect Spillovers Spatially weighted variables +/-
hypothesis (Negative exponential distance matrix)
Environmental Stringency Pollution haven SO2emission per capita (Stern (2005)) -
hypothesis International environmental treaties (ENTRI) -
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7.C Descriptive Statistics
Standard
Variable Observations Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
FDI 13555 3.29 4.06 -10.97 12.75
Lagged FDI 12211 3.39 4.02 -10.97 12.75
Spatial Lag 13555 3.14 2.29 -7.93 11.4
GDP 13415 26.41 1.47 21.16 30
Market Potential 13415 25.22 0.9 21.94 27.79
GDP Growth 13487 2.2 4.29 -50.49 89.83
V.A. Dirty Shares 12074 -1.21 0.32 -5.59 -0.1
Manufacturing Share (%GDP) 10791 2.94 0.36 -0.54 3.77
Risk Index 13386 -4.29 0.2 -4.62 -2.67
Capital Openness 12723 0.64 1.13 -1.33 1.68
Bilateral Investment Treaties 13555 0.26 0.44 0 1
Regional Agreement Trades 13555 0.38 0.49 0 1
Capital Tax Agreements 13555 0.42 0.49 0 1
Oil Resources 13555 0.2 0.4 0 1
Colonial Links 13555 0.08 0.27 0 1
Distance 13555 8.17 1.11 4.09 9.88
Environmental Stringency (SO2pc) 11299 11.36 1.03 5.68 15.53
Spatial Stringency (SO2pc) 11299 11.53 0.58 9.55 14.18
Environmental Stringency (Treaties) 13549 4.4 0.81 0 5.82
Spatial Stringency (Treaties) 13549 4.04 0.48 2.16 4.88
Phone 13474 5.26 1.32 -0.16 6.64
School Enrolment 11168 4.4 0.42 1.61 5.18
Openness 13106 3.36 0.6 1.19 5.26
Exports 13050 24.65 1.53 18.22 27.77
Free Trade Index 13182 1.96 0.2 0.43 2.28
Tari¤ Index 13110 1.42 0.24 -2.07 1.63
Corruption Index 9282 -2.07 0.19 -2.29 -1.13
All variables are expressed in logarithm, except for the dummies variables.
7.D Correlation Matrix
Lagged Spatial Market GDP V.A. Manuf. Risk
FDI FDI Lag GDP Potential Growth Dirty Share Index
FDI 1
Lagged FDI 0.28 1
Spatial Lag 0.25 0.23 1
GDP 0.16 0.18 -0.02 1
Market Potential 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.24 1
GDP Growth 0.03 0.02 0.07 -0.1 0.11 1
V.A. Dirty Shares -0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.07 0 0.01 1
Manuf. Share 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.33 0.16 0.05 1
Risk Index -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.2 -0.43 -0.26 0 -0.1 1
Capital Openness 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.27 0.3 0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.64
BIT -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.2 -0.09 0 -0.02 -0.01 0.42
RAT 0.05 0.04 0 -0.13 0.18 0.04 -0.05 0.09 -0.29
KTA 0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.07 0.13 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.21
Oil Resources 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.34 -0.09 -0.06 0.13 -0.2 0.01
Colonial Links 0.1 0.09 0.07 0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.05 0 0.03
Distance -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 0.12 -0.25 -0.03 0.01 -0.08 0.27
-(SO2pc) -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.1 0.12 -0.08 -0.06 0.05 0.07
Spatial -(SO2pc) -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.1 -0.18 0.08 -0.15 0.01 0.23
Treaties 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.29 0.17 -0.01 0.03 0.17 -0.43
Spatial Treaties 0.08 0.09 0.09 -0.08 0.19 0.08 -0.08 -0.03 -0.32
Phone 0.1 0.11 0.08 0.3 0.4 0.01 -0.03 0 -0.71
School Enrolment 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.25 0.36 0.06 -0.06 0.04 -0.66
Openness -0.03 -0.04 0.1 -0.57 0.21 0.16 0 0.08 -0.16
Exports 0.17 0.19 0.04 0.85 0.46 -0.02 -0.06 0.17 -0.53
Free Trade Index 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.28 0.12 0.01 0.06 -0.57
Tari¤ Index 0.1 0.11 0.05 0.21 0.25 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.45
Corruption Index -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.19 -0.35 -0.07 0.17 -0.01 0.67
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Capital Oil Col. Spatial
Open. BIT RAT KTA Ress. Links Distance -(SO2pc) -(SO2pc)
Capital Openness 1
BIT -0.36 1
RAT 0.23 -0.12 1
KTA 0.2 -0.02 0.5 1
Oil Resources -0.02 -0.13 -0.24 -0.05 1
Colonial Links -0.03 -0.02 -0.12 -0.08 0.03 1
Distance -0.18 0.11 -0.83 -0.54 0.19 0.03 1
-(SO2pc) 0.11 0.03 0.09 0.18 -0.21 -0.04 -0.15 1
Spatial -(SO2pc) -0.31 0.18 -0.23 -0.17 -0.14 0.02 0.26 0.11 1
Treaties 0.37 -0.35 0.44 0.3 0 -0.02 -0.39 -0.02 -0.37
Spatial Treaties 0.25 -0.11 0.51 0.32 -0.17 -0.05 -0.47 -0.01 -0.18
Phone 0.56 -0.33 0.38 0.21 -0.01 -0.06 -0.32 -0.24 -0.41
School Enrolment 0.53 -0.28 0.37 0.21 -0.09 -0.06 -0.27 -0.2 -0.31
Openness 0.1 0.09 0.33 0.17 -0.28 -0.04 -0.32 0.07 0.11
Exports 0.54 -0.31 0.1 0.08 0.23 0 -0.1 -0.05 -0.16
Free Trade Index 0.62 -0.21 0.42 0.23 -0.17 -0.04 -0.33 -0.13 -0.17
Tari¤ Index 0.43 -0.24 0.34 0.15 -0.07 -0.08 -0.22 -0.13 -0.22
Corruption Index -0.44 0.28 -0.25 -0.16 0.01 0.02 0.2 0.14 0.07
Spatial School F. T, Tari¤ Corr.
Treaties Treaties Phone Enrol. Open. Exports Index Index Index
Treaties 1
Spatial Treaties 0.57 1
Phone 0.49 0.47 1
School Enrolment 0.54 0.48 0.83 1
Openness -0.13 0.23 0.08 0.09 1
Exports 0.37 0.12 0.59 0.5 -0.14 1
Free Trade Index 0.3 0.45 0.65 0.6 0.52 0.45 1
Tari¤ Index 0.35 0.37 0.71 0.62 0.09 0.44 0.64 1
Corruption Index -0.33 -0.34 -0.62 -0.54 -0.14 -0.46 -0.54 -0.31 1
All variables are expressed in logarithm, except for the dummies variables.
7.E Spatial Dependence Tests
Bilateral FDI GDP SO2per capita Treaties
year Moran I Geary C Moran I Geary C Moran I Geary C Moran I Geary C
1981 0.12*** 0.89*** 0.23*** 0.74*** 0.08* 0.91* 0.39*** 0***
1982 0.07*** 0.94** 0.12** 0.86** 0.14*** 0.84*** 0.36*** 0***
1983 0.11*** 0.89*** 0.1** 0.85** 0.11** 0.91* 0.33*** 0***
1984 0.1*** 0.93*** 0.2*** 0.77*** 0.21*** 0.79*** 0.34*** 0***
1985 0.19*** 0.81*** 0.25*** 0.72*** 0.26*** 0.73*** 0.33*** 0***
1986 0.11*** 0.91*** 0.31*** 0.67*** 0.24*** 0.74*** 0.31*** 0***
1987 0.13*** 0.88*** 0.16*** 0.78*** 0.22*** 0.75*** 0.33*** 0***
1988 0.15*** 0.86*** 0.26*** 0.71*** 0.23*** 0.77*** 0.29*** 0***
1989 0.2*** 0.8*** 0.32*** 0.67*** 0.31*** 0.7*** 0.32*** 0***
1990 0.19*** 0.84*** 0.31*** 0.67*** 0.29*** 0.72*** 0.31*** 0***
1991 0.14*** 0.87*** 0.35*** 0.63*** 0.25*** 0.76*** 0.18*** 0***
1992 0.14*** 0.89*** 0.34*** 0.65*** 0.27*** 0.75*** 0.07** 0.37
1993 0.12*** 0.89*** 0.3*** 0.69*** 0.25*** 0.76*** 0.03 0.21
1994 0.24*** 0.76*** 0.21*** 0.75*** 0.2*** 0.8*** 0.04* 0.15
1995 0.15*** 0.84*** 0.25*** 0.71*** 0.21*** 0.79*** 0.09*** 0.2
1996 0.17*** 0.84*** 0.28*** 0.68*** 0.27*** 0.73*** 0.13*** 0***
1997 0.18*** 0.82*** 0.31*** 0.66*** 0.16*** 0.84*** 0.15*** 0***
1998 0.09*** 0.91*** 0.28*** 0.68*** 0.18*** 0.82*** 0.16*** 0***
1999 0.12*** 0.89*** 0.26*** 0.69*** 0.18*** 0.81*** 0.18*** 0***
2000 0.15*** 0.86*** 0.26*** 0.69*** 0.16*** 0.84*** 0.17*** 0***
2001 0.14*** 0.86*** 0.28*** 0.68*** 0.33*** 0.66*** 0.18*** 0***
2002 0.14*** 0.86*** 0.33*** 0.65*** 0.2** 0.83* 0.22*** 0***
Both tests performed in logarithm with an inverse exponential distance matrix.
signicant at 10, ** signicant at 5, *** signicant at 1.
7.F Panel Cointegration Test
Specication Lag Statistic p-value
individual intercept 2 -39.757 0
individual intercept and trend 2 -47.429 0
individual intercept 5 -39.717 0
individual intercept and trend 5 -47.311 0
individual intercept 8 -39.533 0
individual intercept and trend 8 -46.836 0
Residuals are computed from the fo llow ing xed e¤ect panel estim ation .
FD I = lagged FDI + GDP source + GDP host + Growth GDP + Capita l Op enness +
Colony + D istance + Contigu ity + Common Language + O il + BIT + RAT +
SO2 per cap ita + Years
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